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Free access to the full text online is included in a subscription. We ask institutions with more than 20.000 users to obtain a price quote directly from the publisher. Contact: sandra.witt@mohr.de. In order to set up Online access for institutions / libraries, please go to: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/register/institutional. In order to set up Online access for private persons, please go to: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/register/personal. I happily defer to authority. If that settled the affair, there would be no need for justification. The authority is in charge. It is her task to decide. Those under her spell trust her. In their baseline (NPP), Xiao and Tan (2014) find effects that can be read along these lines. Yet authorities may have a second agenda. In the PP treatment, the induced concern is straightforward corruption. This is when justification becomes relevant. If they hold temptation constant, but oblige the authority to justify her choice (J), the results are not statistically distinguishable from the baseline. Trust is restored. This is a very interesting finding of direct relevance to institutional design.
Advertising
In this comment, I focus on dynamics. The experiment combines a betweensubjects with a within-subjects manipulation. In the first round all participants face a game where the person that the authority is competent to discipline has a strong incentive to misbehave. In the second and third rounds, these participants are exposed to games with a smaller difference between kind and unkind choices. In their data analysis, the authors aggregate over all three choices per participant to classify reactions to treatment. There is nothing wrong with this. But since they have panel data, I wondered whether there is even more to say. I asked the authors whether they would be willing to share their data with me, which they kindly agreed to do. In my comment I first show that the dynamics do indeed matter. Unfortunately, this also creates a problem with the statistical analysis, to which I turn in conclusion.
As Figure 1 shows, authorities reduce punishment over time if there is no room for corruption or if they must justify their choices. The effect of time is much weaker if there is temptation, but no justification. Note that, in treatments NPP and J, punishment further decreases from period 2 to 3, although on average the incentive structure does not change. Despite the fact that participants did not get feedback, repetition seems to matter. Descriptively there is also a clear effect of time on recipients' choices. Irrespective of treatment, over time recipients become more willing to follow senders' advice. Note that recipients are unaware of payoffs. JITE 170 The effect of time can therefore not result from the fact that temptation is less pronounced for senders in later rounds.
Senders know payoffs. In the first round, payoffs are the same all over. Yet in the second and third rounds, they may be either such that senders could go for the equal split (4,4 instead of 6,2 to their advantage) or such that senders have to be willing to communicate the distribution of payoffs that is to their disadvantage (4,8 instead of 8,4). Figure 2 reports aggregate results separately for unequal and equal payoffs, in the respective round. With equal payoffs, there is a clear effect of time. By contrast, descriptively with unequal payoffs, truth telling is most pronounced in the second round, and decreases in the third round. Table 1 shows that, indeed, there are dynamic effects on the choices of all three classes of actors. Moreover, if one controls for development over time, there is no longer a treatment effect on the willingness of recipients to follow advice. When controlling for the dynamics, senders are even more willing to tell the truth when the temptation to lie is most pronounced (effect of treatment PP, p = 0.089). Thus far, these are just complements to interesting findings in the main paper. Yet unfortunately, the results in Table 1 can only partly be trusted. While the dependence within each individual is arguably captured by the random effect, there is a second level of dependence. Happily it does not matter for the choices of senders. Their experiences are confined to changes in the payoff structure, for which the regression in Table 1 controls. But in later rounds punishers have learned whether senders told the truth in earlier rounds. Likewise recipients have learned whether senders have been punished in earlier rounds. Consequently, for the behavior of punishers and recipients, each session is a single independent observation. There are also not Notes: Random effects logit; data from periods 2 and 3 (due to controlling for truth in first period); * * * p < 0.001, * * p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
e-offprint of the author with publisher's permission JITE 170 enough sessions to adjust standard errors by way of clustering at the highest level of dependence. Actually, in the case of punishment, contagion effects even lead to bias. If the message has been true in the previous period, senders are more likely to be punished now ( p = 0.091). In the second round, the fact that the message was true in the first round and is false now predicts punishment perfectly. In all 10 (of 96) cases, senders are punished. As said, for senders, there is neither a problem with the standard errors nor bias. For recipients and authorities, neither statistical problem matters for choices in the first round. As Table 3 shows, this helps for punishment, but it does not for the decision of recipients to follow the sender's advice. Actually, with punishment, in a Wald test, the comparison between treatments PP and J also turns out significant ( p = 0.0188). Even if they only use data from the first period, a key message of the paper still stands: the obligation to justify choices suffices to keep the risk of authorities being corrupt in check.
